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FEDERAL INCORPORATION
I

INCE the beginning of our national history the Constitution,
which is essentially the source of the law rather than its framework, has with more or less promptitude fulfilled the function
of sanctioning new rules of action which will permit a fairly sym~etrical institutional development in the face of the changing conditions of the environment in which the people live and think and
act. Always the habits of the people are changing, always the situation facts are being modified, and the Constitution in its widest
and truest meaning but provides the means whereby thru this flux
the body of the people may crystallize its thought and usage into
the forms of sanctioned law. It is only by such continual adaptation that the growth of a people becomes not abortive but wholesome and the interrelationship of its parts is kept from perversion.
It is because business has risen to a national scale and geographical markets have come to include several states in most industries
and all states in many industries that there has come a demand for
more direct national regulation1 of those who engage in business on
this scale. It is asserted that uniform rules of organization and
conduct should obtain2 for those dealing in a single market. It is
declared that when one jurisdiction,-a state--creates and lays
down rules of action for a corporation which may never maintain
plant or office within its boundaries and which in almost every case
will exercise its powers in remote states and countries it is deprived
of real vital responsibility.3 It is giving birth to children which it
does not expect to support or govern. There is no likelihood that
this laxity will be overcome until the jurisdiction which can create
corporations is confined exclusively to that one which will have responsibility' ·for their actions in every place.

S

1 The Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Anti·Trust Act while clarifying
the situation and indicating undoubtedly the conviction of the public upon the proper
policy to be henceforth pursued do not, it would seem, constitute a final and unalterable
code of conduct for interstate businesses or lay down a mode of control which may not
need modification. This is the view expressed by W. z. Ripley in "Trusts, Pools and
Corporations" (1917 ed.) p. xxxii.
•Commissioner Garfield-First Report of Comm'r of Corporations, House Doc., Vol
51, No. 165.
• H. L. Wilgns: "Should there be a Federal Incorporation Law for Commercial Cor·
porations?" p. 17.
'This point is emphasized by President Taft in his Special Message to Congress,
Jan. 7, 1910, recommending national incorporation law. See pp. 17·20.
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Is the remedy which is suggested5 of compulsory federal incorporation for all businesses engaged in interstate commerce a constitutionally valid one? That is the question upon which we shall
seek to render an opinion. We shall limit our inquiry strictly to
the legal problems involved. For instance, although there may be
a considerable historical interest in working out the manner and
extent of the influence of Hamilton's Federalist papers upon Marshall's train of thought6 in the early and important decisions affecting this question such studies can have little or no legal significance. Nor shall we indulge in carping criticism of the arguments of the court. We are interested in constitutional interpretation: are there reasonable grounds upon which the Supreme Court
might be expected, in conformity with its traditions, to sustain an
act of Congress requiring that all trading bodies engaged in transacting business in interstate commerce be federally incprporated?
To attempt to solve this problem by pointing out the mistakes the
court has made and interpreting the constitutional powers of Congress as we think they ought to be interpreted logically would be
of no avail even if it were not positively ridiculous. The only way
to arrive at a worth-while answer to this question is to determine
the actual construction put upon constitutional grants and inhibition~ in previous decisions, and their significance, as they stand, for
our problem.
The first great legal land-mark which bears upop. our inquiry is.
the case of McCitlloch v. Maryland. 1 The state of Maryland had
attempted to tax a branch of the second Bank of the United States
located within its jurisdictional limits. The issues raised by the
bank's refusal to pay the assessment were substantially two: (1)
Had the federal government any power to create a corporation?
{2) Could a state government tax a bank federally incorporated?
The court was led in the decision of the first issue to deliberate upon
the nature of the power to incorporate. It decided in unmistakable
terms : "The power of creating a corporation, tho appertaining to
sovereignty, is not, like the power of making war or levying taxes
or of regulating commerce, a great substantive and independent power which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers or used
as a means of executing them. It is never the end for which other
powers are exercised but a means by which other objects are accomplished. No contributions are made to charity for the sake of
1 Bills providing for federal incorporation have been twice introduced in Congress.
One upon Nov. 9, 1903; another Feb. 7, 1910.
•See upon this point an excellent discussion by S. D. M. Hudson: "Federal In·
corporation, 26 Pol Sc. Quar., 863.
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an incorporation, but a corporation is created to administer the
charity.*** The power of creating a corporation is never used for
its own sake.• but for the purpose of effecting something else. No
sufficient reason is therefore perceived why it may not pass as incidental to those powers which are expressly given, if it be a direct
mode of _executing them."
Such being, the view of the court in regard to the nature of the
power to incorporate and the constitutional justification for its exercise by Congress there can be little doubt that it addressed its argu~ent toward validating incorporation of administrative am1s of the
government. Thus if we may suppose the Interstate Commerce
Commission to have been organized in corporate form by Congress
for ·carrying into execution its regulatory power over interstate
coinmerce,8 it would have been a case parallel to that presented and
there seems no doubt but that the court would have upheld the authority vested in such a body. But the court is not concerned with
the question nor does it go out of its way to answer it whether the
power extends further to the erection of corporations for engaging
in a field of activity over which Congress is admittedly empowered
to exercise exclusive control. It is true the court declares the exercise of the power of incorporation to be contingent upon this : "If it
be a direct mode of executing them," i. e., the substantive and independent powers.
In regard to what constitutes "a direct mode" of carrying into
effect the powers expressly granted, the court adopts no binding and
restrictive rule, but leaves a wide latitude of construction to Congress. It is very evident from the context and vital arrangement of
the steps in the argument that the court is disposed to regard as "a
direct mode of executing" these powers any laws which are "necessary and proper" in the words of the constitution itself. For the
examination of that important clause follows immediately the passage just quoted. In the clause9 establishing this grant the court
finds an1ple authority for the exercise of the power of incorporation
in the circumstances of this case, and the construction put upon the
constitutional grant of the powers of Congress certainly does not,
to say the least, inveigh against a resort to like means in the execution of its express powers under the importunate conditions of latter-day interstate commerce. For the court states in memorable
T 4 Wheaton 316.

a As a matter of fact the Supreme Court has held the Interstate Commerce Coni·
mission to be a "body corporate." Tesas & Pacific R. R. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S, 197, In
both form and substance however it differs radically from business corporations.
• Constit. Art. I, Sect. 8.
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words that: "It must have been the intention of those who gave
these (the "substantive and independent") powers, to insure, as
far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This
could not be done by confining the choice of means to such narrow
limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any
which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end.
This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for
ages to come, and, consequently to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs." And finally comes the famous declaration: ''Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
It is worthy of note that the Chief Justice in his opinion was unwilling to go so far as had Mr. Pinckney in his brief for the defendant and rest his decision upon the argument that the bank was
an ann of the United States government employed by it to carry
into effect the measures of its fiscal policy~ Mr. Pinckney had
thought to make his case secure and impregnable by asserting and
emphasizing this aspect of the bank's constitution. He had even
declared in his brief : "The Bank of the United States is as m11ch
an instrument of the government for fiscal purposes as the courts
are its instruments for judicial purposes." Insofar as the right of
a state to tax a body is concerned,' it cannot be denied there is much
cogency to this reasoning. But as a complete statement of the function of the bank the comparison with a court of law falls far short
of the mark. The court has no private interests to advance. The
bank was established for the primary purpose of engaging in productive enterprises and gaining private profit. Its fiscal operations
for the government were always secondary to this original and vital
object. The Chief Justice observed great caution for these reasons
not to overstate the case, not to overemphasize the character of the
bank as an administrative organ of the government, for he recognized that it bore no such intimate relation to the general government as did, for instance, the courts.
In the case of Osborne v. the Second Bank of the United States1°
this identical question was again brought up for consideration. The
court did not shun the task of again establishing its position in reason and law. On the other hand the Chief Justice devoted his opinion to an exhaustive review of all the arguments brought fonvard
by counsel. The conclusions reached in the McCulloch case were
10

9

Wlicat. 738.
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reaffirmed. But the bearing of this decision upon the federal power
of incorporation has long been misconstrued. In order to assign
the precise significance to the train of thought of Chief Justice
MARSITAI,I, which the words of the opinion convey, it is necessary
to revert to the briefs presented to the court.
The basis of Mr. Hammond's argument against the constitutionality of the ·bank is clearly that it was a private business organized
for private gain, whereas it could be constitutional only if it were an
agency or an instrumentality incorporated by Congress in order to
~a.rry out some one of its granted or implied powers. That this is
the essence of his argument is plain from the following excerpt:
"Deriving great advantage from its trade, anxious to extend it into
other states, and to be relieved from the embarrassments incident
to a joint stock company not incorporated, the corporation applies to
the Congress of the United States for an act of incorporation. But
this Congress cannot confer, unless the association can be employed
by the national government in the execution of some of the power
with which it is invested by the constitution,"-i. e., unless the association have a 'political connection' with the government. The argument proceeds: "The fact that an individual employs his private
means in the service of the government, attaches to them no immunity whatever. It is only in this character that the Bank is in
public employ. The business it transacts for the government originates in contract. It receives the public treasure upon deposit, and
pays it out upon the checks of the proper officer. This is an individual business transacted for the government precisely as if it were
an individual concern * * * It is one department of its trade by
which it makes individual profit."
Now this was the essence of the argument that Johll Marshall
answered, and it is submitted that he cannot be considered to haYe
used the words 'political connection' in any other sense than as they
would be plainly understood in answering Mr. Hammond's argument. That he was addressing his reasoning to Mr. Hammond's
argument cann.ot well be doubted considering the form in which the
Chief Justice stated the case.11 And as to this argument, what does
the court decide? It is this: "The argument supposes the corpora_tion to have been originated for the management of an individual
concern, to be founded upon contract between individuals, having
private trade and private profit for its great end and principal object. If these premises were true, the conclusion drawn from them
would be inevitable." But what was the conclusion drawn? Sim11 Ibid.,

page 859.
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ply that the Bank was taxable by the state government. It was not
an argument addressed to the existence of the bank. They were not
talking about the right of Congress to erect a corporation. In short,
they were not talking about the constitutionality of federal incorporation, but only about the constitutionality of state taxation of
federal corporations of a certai-n kind.12
The court says : "This mere private corporation, engaged in its
own business, with its own views, would certainly be subject to taxation power of the state, as any individual would be;" * * * "But
the premises are not true. The Bank is not considered as a private
corporation, * * * but as a public corporation, created for public and
national purposes." And the Chief Justice continues in these words:
"It was not created for its own sake or private purposes. It has
never been supposed that Congress could create such a corporation."
Now what is the proper meaning of this last phrase? This is the
decisive question. It seems to me that, considering the context, it
can only be understood to mean: that Congress could not create a
corporation for private purposes which woitld be exempt from state
ta:i:ation. This question was certainly the only one the court had to
decide, and consequently was in all prob.ability the only one they
had in mind. There was no other point involved.
When the Chief Justice goes on to consider: "Why is it that Congress can incorporate or create a bank?" it should be borne in mind
that he is not taking up the justification for any act of federal incorp.oration whatsoever, but only of a corporation which shoitld. be
exempt from state taxation. One may fairly conclude that there
were no lurking doubts in the minds of the court about the power
of Congress to incorporate an ordinary corporation; or even that
such an ordinary business corporation, federally chartered, might be
taxed by a state government. The only point admissible to controversy was: Why is it that Congress can incorporate or create a Bank
--i.e., a private enterprise yet so constituted by its "political connection" with the federal government as to be exempt from state
ta..'ration. And the substance of the argument that follows is that
because "it is an instrument which is 'necessary and proper' for
carrying on the fiscal operations of government," it is, despite its
organization for private profit, exempt from state taxation. 'l'hat
this is in fact the whole trend of the argument becomes so apparent
as scarcely to admit of a doubt when at the conclusion there occurs
12 This is why all the hair-splitting argument ov~ the phrase "politic:11 connection"
is beside the point. Goodnow: "Social Reform and the Constitution," Chap. III. Hudson:
"Federal Incorporation," Pol. Sc. Quar. (19n) p. 75 et seq.
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this remark: "To tax its faculties, its trades, and occupation, is to
tax the bank itself. To destroy or preserve the one is to destroy
or preserve the other."
The charter of the second Bank of the United States, however,
expired by limitation in 1834 and was not renewed. But the financial exigencies of the Civil War again brought about a demand for a
national banking system. After some impractical experimentation
the law of June 3rd, 1864, was passed, which provided the framework for our national banking system for half a century. Under it
~anks might be organized under a federal charter, and provision
was made for note-issue upon the basis of United States bonds deposited with a bureau of the federal government.
A leading case which arose under this law was that of Farmers
and Mechanics Bank v. Dearing.13 The facts were that a promissory
note had been discounted by the plaintiff bank at the rate of ten
per centum per annum. The maximum rate legally chargeable in
that jurisdiction (New York) was seven per centum per annum.
The Act of Congress had provided that "charging a greater rate of
interest than the legal should be held and adjudged a forfeiture of
the entire interest which the note carries with it," whereas by the
New York rule the penalty was a forfeiture of the entire principal
of the note. In this case, then, we are again confronted 'vith a state
regulation of a corporation which is chartered by, and an agency of,
the federal government. The regulation is of a different character
but the power brought in question is identical. Can Congress create a
corporation which not only may not be taxed by a state government
but which may not be subject to state regulations of civil liability?
The court said: "The constitutionality of the act of 1864 is not in
question. It rests on the same principle as the act creating the second Bank of the United States. * * * The national banks organized
under the act are instruments designed to be used to aid the government in the administration of an important branch of the public service. They are means appropriate to that end. Of the degree of the
necessity which existed for creating them, Congress is the sole
judge. * * * The power to create carries with it the power to preserve. The latter is a corollary from the former. The principle announced in the authority cited is indispensable to the efficiency, the
independence. and indeed to the beneficial existence of the General
Government, otherwise it would be liable, in the discharge of its
most important trusts to be annoyed and thwarted by the will or
caprice of every state in the Union. Infinite confusion would fol-
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low. The government would be reduced to a pitiable condition of
weakness."
Here again it is affirmed that the states may· not "by taxation or
otherwise. * * * burthen or in any manner control" a corporation,
federally chartered, which exercises the powers of an agent of the
central government in the execution of any of the powers vested in
it. Over such class of federal ·Corporations the laws of the states
are ineffectual, save in those respects upon which Congress is silent
and in which the application of the state law is not inconsistent14
with the express or implied will of Congress. But again we should
remind ourselves that the case in no way impinges the latent power
to create federal corporations which are not "instruments designed
to be used to aid the government in the administration of an important branch of the public service" as the court describes the
national banks in this case. For this other class of federal corporations may be subject to state control in greater degree; but at least
there is no argument here as to their constitutionality.
Now the contribution this line of bank cases makes to constitutional interpretation in respect of the power of Congress under the
interstate commerce clause to create federal corporations is mainly
negative but partly positive. It is positive insofar as it established
beyond dispute the power of Congress to erect corporations at all.
There is no express constitutional grant of power to incorporate,
but by this line of cases that power has been definitely settled, so
far at least as this : that it may be used to carry out a constitutional
power. The remaining question is: in how far may the exercise of
this power be limited by the requirement of its employment only
as an agency for the execution of an express power? In short, may
it be used as an indirect as well as a direct agency? The negative
contribution of these bank cases, providing the validity of the foregoing analysis be accepted, is that the power is not expressly limited
to a ci:eation of arms of the government. It is not confined to the
grant of a corporate form to governmental bureaus, commissions
and offices charged with the administration of a particular function
of the federal government. Nor if this position can be supported
by subsequent developments is this negative contribution to be considered lightly and as of small significance. On the contrary it is
because the legal profession has failed to see in this line of cases
any other principle than a direct denial of the power of Congress
to erect business and manufacturing corporations that they have been
skeptical of its constitutionality.
" See 91 U. S. 34-35.
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Accordingly our next step will be to seek to determine whether
and how far the assertion of this power of incorporation in other
directions is, according to judicial determination, consistent with the
view expressed above. Have subsequent decisions involving this
power of Congress interpreted it as ,extending beyond the rigid limits of such bodies as have a "political connection" with the central
government?, And if so, does the direction of such interpretation
lend cogency to the argument that Congress by virtue of its exhaustive control over interstate commerce may require all business
groups and bodies, other than individual citizens, engaging therein
to be chartered by the federal government?
The second direction, in point both of time and of importance, in
which Congress has exercised its power to create corporations was
the chartering of the Pacific railroads. This use of the power to
incorporate like that in connection with the national banking system
came out of the pressing emergencies of the Civil War. It was a
period of national peril and of constitutional turmoil. Nevertheless the steps taken then cannot be retraced ; and they have exercised a profound influence upon our constitutional development in
many ways.
The question has sometimes been raised whether the Pacific railroads were actually federal corporations or merely state corporations
to whom were granted certain federal franchises. But there can
be no doubt, in view of the wording of the statutes, that Congress
did by the act of July I, 1862, and by the provisions of the act of
July 2, 1864, authorize federal incorporation. Subsequently in 18:30,
acting in reliance upon Section 161 G of each of those acts a consolidation was effected between the Union Pacific Railroad Company
(which was already wholly a federal company) and the Kansas
Pacific Railway Company and the Denver Pacific Railway and 'J'elegraph Company. This consolidation was named The Union Pacific
Railway Company, and in the case of Ames v. Kansas,16 it was held
to accede to full capacities of the original company having a specific
grant of charter, and to have legally absorbed the constituent state
and territorial corporations. And in California v. Central Pad.fie Rail"'July 1, 1862, Section 16-"That at any time after the pass:ige of this act all of the
railroad companies named herein, and assenting thereto, or any two or more of them, .have
authority to form themselves into one consolidated company; notice of such consolidation
in writing shall be filed in the Department of the Interior, and such consolidated company
shall thereafter proceed to construct said railroad and branches and telegraph line upon
the terms and conditions provided in this act."
:sJI III

U. S.

449•
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road Company11 the court again recognized that the grant of certain
valuable franchises to a state corporation coupled with its acceptance of the same and registration in the Department of Interior,
constituted it a federal corporation. In this latter case the court
states : "Thus without referring to the other franchises and privileges conferred upon this company, the fundamental franchise was
given by the acts of 1862 and the subsequent Acts to construct a
railroad from the Pacific Ocean across the state of California and
the federal territories, until it should meet the Union Pacific; which
it did meet at Ogden, in the terirtory of Utah. This important
grant, tho in part collateral to, was independent of, that made to the
corporation by the State of California, and has ever since been possessed and enjoyed.*** If, therefore, the Central Pacific Railroad
Company is not a federal corporation its most important franchises,
including that of constructing a railroad from the Pacific Ocean to
Ogden City, were conferred upon it by Congress." And as evidence
that the change was considered as a change of the source of their
charter, the Kansas Pacific Railway Company as a part of Union
Pacific Railroad Company reenacted its by-laws and reelected its
officers.
In this same case appears the well-considered opinion that the
power of Congress over interstate commerce includes the power to
erect corporations to transact interstate business, and that its power
in this direction is full and exhaustive. The passage is important
and I quote at length: "It cannot at the present day be doubted
that Congress, under the power to regulate commerce among the
several states as well as to provide for postal accommodations and
military exigencies, had authority to pass these laws. The power
to construct or to authorize individuals or corporations to construct
national highways and bridges from state to state, is essential to the
complete control of interstate commerce. Without authority in
Congress to establish and maintain such highways and bridges. it
would be without authority to regulate one of the most important
adjuncts of commerce. This power in former times was exerted to
a very limited extent, the Cumberland or National Road being the
most notable instance. * * * But, since in consequence of the ex-'
pansion of the country, the multiplication of its products, and the
invention of railroads and locomotion by steam, land transportation
has so vastly increased, a sounder consideration of the subject has
prevailed and led to the conclusion that Congress has plenary power
over the whole subject. * * * (This) power was very freely exertT 127

U. S.
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cised and much to the general satisfaction in the creation of the vast
system of railroad connecting the East with the Pacific, traversing
States as well as Territories, and employing the agency of state as
well as federal corporations."
It will be noticed here that there was maintained a carefully constructed barrier behind which future decisions might hedge if occasion demanded. In spite of such phrases as "complete control,'' and
"plenary power" the opinion constantly bears on the fact that in
this case it is dealing with a transportation agency as such, and even
i:efers to the Cumberland Road, presumably for the purpose of drawing the parallel to highways which from time immemorial have been
regarded as peculiarly under the care of the government. Nevertheless this identification cannot be admitted as complete. There
are important differences between private railroads, though common carriers, and public highways.
But the point is that there is a step forward from the position
reached in the bank cases, in that common carriers are not administrative organs of the general government in any sense. Their incorporation, moreover, is not a direct but an indirect means of regulating interstate commerce. First, it is decided that Congress may
incorporate bodies serving as administrative arms of the government. Second, it is decided that Congress may incorporate public
service businesses engaged in the actual transfer of goods,18 persons,
intelligence, etc., in interstate commerce. Third, it remains to be
determined whether Congress may incorporate ordinary mercantile
and manufacturing bodies transacting business across state boundaries. Fourth. it further remains to be determined whether Congress may make federal incorporation for firms so engaged compulsory.
The distinction between the second and third classes of business
is well recognized, the familiar legal characterization of it is ~hat the
former are "affected with a public interest" and for that reason
bear "a special relation" to the governing authority. But the distinction between the first and second classes of organization is no
less marked. In upholding the power exercised in the creation of
the Pacific railroad corporations the court made a signal advance
over the stage of constitutional interpretation in this direction
reached by the line of bank cases. Moreover, we should remember
that the distinction between the agent conducting the transportation
DA short hut incisive review of the authorities upon this point is contained in an
article in 30 Harvard Law Review, 589 by C. W. Bunn. The author seems inclined to
minimize the difficulties that will be encountered, ho\vever.
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in interstate commerce and the business whose property is moved
in interstate commerce has never been employed in any decisive way
in any case up to the present time; as has the distinction between
manufacturing and commerce. Hence the gap to be bridged in extending the power of incorporation to the third class of business
would seem no more difficult to negotiate than the step taken from
the first to the second class.
To continue, the principal point in the above case of Californfrz. v.
Pacific Railroad Company19 is whether or not a state may tax a
corporation, as such, which derives its franchise from the federal
government. The court follows the same rule in regard to transportation corporations that it had already laid down in respect of
banking corporations. The court said: They (the franchises) were
granted to the company for national purposes and to subserve national ends. It seems very clear that the state of California can
neither take them away nor destroy nor abridge them, nor cripple
them by onerous burdens. Can it tax them? It may undoubtedly
tax outside visible property of the company situated within the state.
This is a different thing. But can it tax franchises which are the
grant of the United States? In our judgment it cannot." The
court goes on to define a franchise which it says is : "a right, privilege, or power of public concern, which ought not to be exercised
by private individuals at their mere will and pleasure, but should be
reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly or by public agents, acting under such conditions and
regulations as the government may impose in the public interest and
for the public security."
It should be evident that the court means by "public agents," the
railroad companies themselves and not such administrative bodies
over the railroads as the Interstate Commerce Commission was subsequently constituted. For this reason in the application of the
term "public agents" a wide latitude may be sanctioned, since it is
clear that the decision in each one of these western railway cases is
based on the Congressional control over interstate commerce and
not on the postal or military power. Consequently it would seem
that the essential elements constituting these bodies "public agents"
is the grant of a franchise to conduct an interstate transportation
business in the public interest, but for private profit. It may be answered that Congress created these transportation systems under
special circumstances and exigencies to facilitate interstate commerce. But even so, is not Congress the judge of the degree of
:19

127

u. s. 40.
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necessity which exists to warrant the facilitation of interstate commerce by requiring uniform federal incorporation? Once admitted
that the power rests in Congress to erect corporations for facilitating interstate commerce, in determining the conditions which justify
its exercise and the extent of its exercise, the court will not review
the wisdomzo of the legislative policy.
The view of the status of these western railroads which has been
taken above is fully confirmed by the decisions in the two following
cases, in both of which this point was adjudicated: Railroad Company v. Peniston21 and the United States v. The Union Pacific Railroad Company. 22 In the latter case the court stated: "The proposition is that the United States, as the grantor of the franchises of the
company, the author of its charter, and the donor of lands, rights,
and privileges of immense value, and as parens patriae, is a trustee,
invested with power to enforce the proper use of the property and
franchises granted for the benefit of the public. * * * But in answer
to this it must be said that, after all, it is but a railroad company,
with the ordinary powers of such corporations. 23 Under its contract
with the government, the latter has taken good care of itself; and
its rights may be judicially enforced without the aid of this trust
relati9n. They may be aided by the general legislative powers of
Congress (those of any sovereign over the corporations which it
creates), and by those reserved in the charter.
That the court did not at this period consider that it was justified in "going the whole length," however, (as this passage might
intimate) and validating this exercise of the power of incorporation
upon the broad ground that it was competent for Congress, by virtue of its full and exclusive power over interstate commerce, to incorporate all commercial bodies engaged in that commerce is evident
from the subsequent decision in the Pacific Removal cases.2"' There.
the issue turned upon a jurisdictional matter and does not concern
us, but the principle contained in the following statement is significant in regard to the court's view of the status of these corporations. "The Union Pacific Railroad Company * * * was strictly a
corporation of the United States*** The facts that the last-named
company is one of the constituent elements of the consolidated company, and that the entire system of roads now in its possession and
"'Marbflr;v v. Madison,

1

Cranch

13?;

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, n

Peters 420; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27.
2118 Wall. 5.
"'98 u. s. 569, 61~·619•
.. Italics mine.
SI 115

U. S.

1, 15.
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under its charge and control constitutes one of the most comprehensive and important mediums of interstate commerce in the country,
and that in all its transactions it is subject to the supervision and
control of the Government of the United States are sufficient, it
seems to us, to bring the Kansas cases, as well as the other cases,
fairly within the principle of Osborn v. The Bank." The railroads
are, thus, a "medium" of interstate commerce and not merely a trading body engaged in that commerce. They are technological instruments for the interstate distribution of goods-sharply distinguished from the commodities which pass along these channels. 25
We may conclude that the following principles are confirmed or
established by these western railroad cases : first, Congress may charter corporations for certain purposes ; second, Congress may create
railroad corporations to engage in interstate transportation, i. e.,
corporations endowed with a public interest but organized and conducted by private patties strictly for profit; third, it is a sufficient
basis for the exercise of this power that in the judgment of Congress the erection of such corporations will "tend to facilitate" interstate commerce. It is not for the courts to decide upon the expediency of employing this means of "facilitating commerce"-that is
left to the discretion of Congress. A fourth point is found in the
fact that while the decisions certainly do not affirm that any more
extensive power to incorporate resides with Congress, yet they do
not deny either expressly or by strong implication that ordinary
trading bodies engaged in interstate commerce may be so incorporated. Accordingly it remains to inquire whether upon any subsequent occasions in which Congress may have directly exercised its
power to incorporate the court has modified this position, either by
restricting the power to administrative anns of the government and
public-service or "national-service" industries, or by extending it to
_ordinary private business concerns.
The next direction in which Congress saw fit to exercise its power to incorporate was in the creation of a bridge company.26 Some
difficulty having arisen in regard to the _acquisition of land at convenient points in the states of New Jersey and New York, and the
right to bridge the navigable waters of the Hudson River, a charter
'"See Johnson v. So. Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 1.
"" It has been a general rule even where state corporations wished to construct a
bridge across navigable streams to apply for the approval of Congress. See Southern
Illinois and Missouri Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1; and Williamette Bridge Co. v.
Hatch, 1.25 U. S. 12, and cases cited. And in one such instance the right of eminent
domain was granted by Congress. Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. R., 32 Fed. 9.
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was granted for the purpose upon application to Congress. 27 The Act
of Congress of July II, ISsJo, incorporating the company, after providing specifically for the usual corporate powers, further provides
that: "r1nd generally and specially for the fully carrying out of the
provisions of this act, the said North River Bridge Company and its
successors shall have and possess all such right and power to enter
upon lands, and for the purchase, acquisition, condemnation, * * *
and use of real estate and other property, and for the location, construction, operation and maintenance of said bridge with its app_roaches, terminals and appurtenances as are possessed by the railroad or bridge companies in the States of New York and New Jersey, respectively."
On the problem of the objects for which Congress may create
corporations this case throws no new light. One sentence will indicate this : ''Congress, therefore, may create corporations as appropriate means of executing the powers of government, as, for instance, a bank for the purpose of carrying on the fiscal operations
qf the United States or a railroad corporation for the purpose of
promoting commerce28 among the states." And the court continues :
"The power of Congress, by its own legislation, to confer original
authority to erect bridges over navigable streams whenever Congress
considers it necessary to do so to meet the demands of the interstate
commerce by land is so clearly demonstrated, as to render further
discussion of the subject superfluous." It should be evident, therefore, that the principle of this case does not extend beyond that
of the western railroad cases, though it certainly confirms and fortifies it. 29 But it does open the way very clearly to an extension of
the position then arrived at; for in the opinion, delivered by Justice
GRAY, great emphasis is placed upon the broad doctrine that this
was a means "to facilitate commerce" approved by Congress. Now
if this be the test of the extent of the power in Congress to incorporate it certainly provides an "open door'' for upholding a compulsory national incorporation law. To require uniform rules of
liability, of stock-issue, of dividend-declaration, of the accountability of directors-to place all national business within one legal juris:n Luxton

v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525.

:s Italics by the present writer. The great disparity in the nature of the two pur·
poses should not escape attention.
.
"'In this case altho the act of incorporation mentions the motives of provision for
post-roads and military equipment in addition to the promotion of interstate commerce,
yet it is clear that the bridge was intended primarily for the improvement of the mediums
of interstate commerce. The time element no less than the place consideration supports
this view. See also the words of Mr. Justice Miller in U. S. v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co., 98 U. S. 618-619.
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diction-surely this would "facilitate interstate commerce" more
than many North River bridges. The added security and stability
would increase the volume of interstate dealing considerably and
hence augment the national income. And what means could be
more "appropriate," more suitable, more equitable, more politic than
to require federal incorporation of companies doing an interstate
business? Indeed what other means is available that does not directly impose limitations30 upon the sovereign action of the states ;
and lead to enormous wastes in jurisdictional litigation? However we must remember that the North River Bridge case itself does
no more than open the way for the general application of this
broad test to the constitutionality of acts of Congress involving this
power. For actually in this case as in the western railroad cases the
court was dealing with a class of corporations which have always
borne a peculiar place in our polity. They were all public utilities.
Three were common carriers and one was the operator of a public
toll bridge. All were bound to serve the public. They were authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain. Nevertheless the
broad ground upon which the court did base its decision in the North
, River Bridge case has a considerable significance as we have indicated.
Congress has exercised the power of incorporation in a national
way in still another class of cases, the constitutionality of which has
never been questioned before the Supreme Court. Congress has
erected corporations to provide and maintain homes for disabled
soldiers and for other charitable purposes. The construction put
upon this power by the Ohio Supreme Court in the case of 0'llerlwlser v. National Home for Disabled Soldiers3 1 is interesting as
manifesting the att.itude taken by the states. The officers of the corporation were sued in tort and the court considered the question of
whether these officers were in effect agents of the United States and
the United States itself the real party in interest. The court decided that: "A suit against a public corporation, having no other
powers than the performance of a function of the government and
accomplishing no other object is plainly a suit against the government." And it. remarked in a passage construing the character of
the corporation: "that it is performing an appropriate and constitutional function of the general government nobody doubts, for at
this time it is too late to question the power of Congress to create
80 In regard to infringement upon reserve powers of the states, see Wilgus, op. cit.,
pp. 37-47. Hendrick: "Power to Regulate Corporations ••• " does not think this objection would be vital, pp. a67·270.
:n 67 N. E. 487.

So
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corporations for such purposes." Evidently the court was under the
impression that all the instances in which this power had so far been
exercised by Congress fell within that category, for the latest case
of Liexton v. North River Bridge Company was cited in support of
the conclusion. As we have seen, however, such a construction of
the western railroad cases, at least, is too narrow in view of all the
facts.
MYRON W. WATKIN~.

University of Missouri.
(TO Bit CONTINUED.)

